The Zimmermann telegram which was sent by Arthur Zimmermann, proposing an alliance between Germany and Mexico in the First World War. When intercepted by the British, this raw intelligence required decryption, translation and confirmation and then was still just part of the overall case made for US entry into the conflict.[1]
In the period after the First World War, British practise was to circulate raw intelligence with little analysis or context.[5] Such direct intelligence was a strong influence on policy-makers.[5]Churchill was especially keen to see raw intelligence and was supplied this by Desmond Morton during his period outside the government.[6] When Churchill became Prime Minister in 1940, he still insisted on receiving raw intelligence and wanted it all until it was explained that the volume was now too great.[6] A selection of daily intercepts was provided to him each day by Bletchley Park and he called these his "golden eggs".[6]
US intelligence has a different tradition from the British. The key event for the US was the failure to prevent the attack on Pearl Harbor and the inquiries which followed concluded that this was not due to the lack of raw intelligence so much as the failure to make effective use of it. The Central Intelligence Agency was created to collate, analyse and summarise the raw intelligence collected by the other departments. US agencies which focus on the collection of raw intelligence include the National Reconnaissance Office and the National Security Agency.[7]
^Clark, J. Ransom (2007), "Intelligence and National Security: A Reference Handbook", Contemporary Military, Strategic, and Security Issues, Greenwood: 47, ISBN9780275992989, ISSN1932-295X
^"Intelligence Branch". fbi.gov. Raw intelligence is often referred to as "the dots"—individual pieces of information disseminated individually. Finished intelligence reports "connect the dots" by putting information in context and drawing conclusions about its implications.
^Phythian, Mark (18 July 2013). Understanding the Intelligence Cycle. Routledge. ISBN978-1136765919. Raw intelligence reports generally include what the collector thinks the analyst needs to know from the source; however, processing the raw intelligence often throws up gaps, ambiguities, uncertainties and conflicts in the raw reporting.
^Oseth, John M. (1985), Regulating U.S. Intelligence Operations, University Press of Kentucky, p. 12, ISBN9780813115344
^ abJeffrey, Keith (1987), A. Robertson (ed.), "British Military Intelligence Following World War I", British and American Approaches to Intelligence, Springer, pp. 55–84, ISBN9781349084180
^ abcAndrew, Christopher (2012), Michael I. Handel (ed.), "Churchill and Intelligence", Leaders and Intelligence, Routledge, p. 181, ISBN9781136287169
^Davies, Philip (2002), "Ideas of intelligence: Divergent National Concepts and Institutions", Harvard International Review, 24 (3): 62–66
