1 November 1957 (1957-11-01)–31 March 1965 (1965-03-31)
Operation Reflex was a Cold War operation that placed medium bombers of Strategic Air Command (SAC) on nuclear alert at European and North African stations that were closer to their potential targets than their home bases in the United States. It began in 1957 and continued until 1965, when it ended as a result of the increased number of weapons systems capable of striking targets from stations in the United States, fiscal decisions and the pending removal of Boeing B-47 Stratojets from SAC's inventory.
With the exception of the Convair B-36 Peacemaker, early Strategic Air Command (SAC) bombers had to deploy to forward bases to be in range of targets in the Soviet Union. During the Berlin Airlift, SAC deployed 62 Boeing B-29 Superfortresses from MacDill and Rapid City Air Force Bases to England. Starting in the early 1950s, SAC began to rotate its medium bomber units to England for 90 day periods. Rotation bases were added in Spain and Morocco as well as England for missions heading eastward and to Andersen Air Force Base, Guam for those heading west. These bombers' home bases in the United States were designed more to facilitate deployments than to support attacks on the Soviet Union. Until Limestone Air Force Base, Maine was constructed, even B-36s relied on staging bases in Labrador and Newfoundland.[1]
Although doctrine called for theater commanders to control bases and forces under their control, SAC's experience during the Korean War, in which its two deployed B-29 wings, the 22nd and 92nd, operated from Far East Air Forces (FEAF) bases and operated under FEAF control,[b] convinced it that it needed to be able to operate from overseas bases under its control.[2]
While overseas bases continued to be required while SAC maintained a medium bomber force, they became primarily recovery bases or bases from which a second strike might be launched.[3] However, although SAC bombers were deployed to forward locations where they would be able to strike targets in the Soviet Union, they were not on nuclear alert.[4] In the mid-1950s, the Soviet Union began to substantially increase its long range bomber force. In response, SAC planners proposed to keep SAC bombers on alert with weapons loaded and crews nearby, ready for takeoff. After several tests of the concept, SAC units began to put planes and crews on alert on 1 October 1957.[5] 1 November, SAC announced publicly that it had armed bombers at the end of runways ready to take off within 15 minutes.[6]
Reflex alert operations
B-47 on Reflex alert at RAF Brize Norton
Preparation for overseas alert began in July 1957, when four wings from SAC's Second Air Force each sent five bombers to Sidi Slimane Air Base, Morocco. On 1 October, overseas nuclear alert began, called Operation Reflex.[c] Reflex tours of duty in Europe and Morocco were usually for 90 days,[7] and individuals, rather than units, rotated overseas. In addition to positioning its strike force closer to targets in the Soviet Union, Reflex dispersed SAC's bomber force, making it more difficult to target.[8] Unlike earlier SAC unit deployments overseas, Reflex aircraft did not fly training or operational missions, but remained on ground alert while deployed.[9]
A typical Reflex deployment would resemble that at RAF Fairford, which began Reflex operations on 7 January 1958. Second Air Force and Eighth Air Force each operated fifteen B-47s split between Fairford and RAF Greenham Common. These planes were drawn from six different bombardment wings. Individual aircraft were rotated weekly.[10] When aircraft rotated, they did not necessarily return to the United States, but sometimes moved to another Reflex base.[11] There were more crews than aircraft. Crews typically arrived at their Reflex bases on SAC KC-97s, rather than with ferried bombers. Typical cycles for aircrew involved two week-long alert periods, with a week's rest between.[9]
The gradual phase out of Boeing B-47 Stratojets and Boeing KC-97 Stratofreighters from SAC's inventory, coupled with a serious balance of payments problem led to the end of Operation Reflex.[15] An earlier RAND study indicated that forward based bombers were vulnerable to attacks by Soviet light bombers stationed in satellite nations,[d] while Soviet long range aviation would still be available to attack the United States. Moreover, Boeing B-52 Stratofortress heavy bombers were capable of extending their range through air refueling from Boeing KC-135 Stratotankers. SAC revised its basing policy with one named Full House, in which B-47s would be located in the United States, using KC-97s stationed in the Northeastern United States[e] to give them a head start to refuel bombers, which would be able to strike Soviet targets directly.[3] Finally, developments in nuclear weapons provided lighter nuclear warheads, which in turn made intercontinental ballistic missiles practical delivery systems by the early 1960s.[16] The Navy was also able to deploy submarine-launched ballistic missiles in the early 1960s.[17]
SAC was also switching from a "perimeter" strategy, relying on bases in foreign nations to a "polar" strategy, allowing its bombers to strike from bases in the United States.[18] Reductions in Operation Reflex began in 1963 with the withdrawal of the United States military from Morocco.[19][f] The program was finally phased out on 31 March 1965.[15]
Reflex bases
The following list, organized by country, lists the supporting SAC unit and the unit responsible for nuclear weapons at the installation:
^Aircraft is Boeing KC-97G-29-BO Stratofreighter, serial 53-0172 of the 100th Air Refueling Squadron. This plane was later converted to a KC-97L and transferred to the Spanish Air Force. Dirkx, Marco (7 June 2025). "1953 USAF Serial Numbers". Joe Baugher’s Serial Number List. Retrieved 13 July 2025.
^Ultimately, the theater commander (in this case an Army general, Douglas MacArthur), approved targeting for the SAC bombers in the Pacific, overruling requests to concentrate on strategic targets in North Korea. Schake, p. 69. Later, SAC was able to deploy the 98th and 307th Bombardment Groups for 30 days of temporary duty to strike strategic targets. When they remained in the Far East beyond the 30 days, they came under FEAF control. Schake, p. 70.
^Although properly named "Reflex Action,"[7] it was more commonly called Operation Reflex, or simply Reflex. Schake, p. 181.
^Primarily from bases in the German Democratic Republic. SAC sought to minimize this threat by selecting bases that, while within the range of its medium bombers to their assigned targets, were as far away from Soviet light bomber bases as possible. Schake, p. 96.
^KC-97s were also stationed in or deployed to Canada, Greenland, Bermuda, and Alaska. Haulman, p. 60.
^The establishment of these bases had been negotiated with the French government. After Morocco became independent, there was substantial opposition to their continued use. Schrake, p. 115, n. 45.
^SAC's 65th Air Division in Spain was devoted to the air defense mission, and reflex support units were assigned directly to Sixteenth Air Force.[13]
Willard, TSG Richard R. (1988) [1968]. Location of United States Military Units in the United Kingdom, 16 July 1948-31 December 1967. USAF Air Station, South Ruislip, United Kingdom: Historical Division, Office of Information, Third Air Force. LCCN68061579.
Adams, Gerald M. (1992). A History of U.S. Strategic Air Bases in Morocco, 1951-1963. Omaha, NE: Moroccan Reunion Association.
Freedman, Lawrence (1981). The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. London, England: The Macmillan Ltd.
Miller, Roger G., ed. (1995). Seeing Off the Bear: Anglo-American Air Power Cooperation During the Cold War. Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museum Program. ISBN978-1477604441.
