Anti-Russian sentiment

Anti-Russian sentiment or Russophobia is the dislike or fear of Russia, Russian people, or Russian culture. The opposite of Russophobia is Russophilia.

Historically, Russophobia has included state-sponsored and grassroots mistreatment and discrimination, as well as propaganda containing anti-Russian sentiment.^[1][2] In Europe, Russophobia was based on various more or less fantastic fears of Russian conquest of Europe, such as those based on The Will of Peter the Great forgery documented in France in the 19th century and later resurfacing in Britain as a result of fears of a Russian attack on British-colonized India in relation to the Great Game. Pre-existing anti-Russian sentiment in Germany is considered to be one of the factors influencing treatment of Russian population under German occupation during World War II.

A variety of popular culture clichés and negative stereotypes about Russians still exist, notably in the Western world.^[3] Some individuals may have prejudice or hatred against Russians due to history, racism, propaganda, or ingrained stereotypes.^{[4][5][6][7][8]} Negative views of Russia are widespread, but most prevalent in Western liberal democracies.^[9][10][11]

Some analysts have argued that official Western rhetoric and journalism about Russian actions abroad, such as the Second Chechen War, the 2008 Russo-Georgian war and Russian interference in the 2016 United States election, have contributed to the resurgence of anti-Russian sentiment.^[12][13][14] Anti-Russian sentiment rose considerably after the start of the Russian war against Ukraine in 2014.^[15] By the summer of 2020, the majority of Western nations had unfavorable views of Russia.^[16]

Following the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russian-speaking immigrants experienced harassment, open hostility and discrimination, regardless of whether or not they were ethnic Russians.^[17][18][19]

Some researchers have described narratives of Russophobia as a propaganda tactic used by the government of Russia and its supporters. These narratives emphasize the belief that Russia faces an existential threat from the Western powers and must take drastic measures to ensure domestic stability including support for the ongoing war in Ukraine.^[20][21][22]

Anti-Russian sentiment in Europe has a long history, dating back several centuries. Initially, it was largely driven by religious and cultural differences, as well as Russia's expansionist policies.^{[23]: 114–115} This sentiment has evolved over time, but the underlying themes of perceived barbarism, imperialism, and cultural inferiority have remained constant.^{[23]: 104–105}

Negative views of Russia in Europe began to take shape in the 15th century during the period of Russian expansion into non-Russian lands under Ivan III. Russia's campaigns against Poland-Lithuania, Livonian cities, and Swedish-held Finland marked the beginning of a perception of Russia as a threat. During this era, Russia was often portrayed as a barbaric, un-Christian, and imperialistic nation by its European adversaries.^{[23]: 104–105} Michael C. Paul argued that the crusades of the 13th century against Russian Christian cities like Novgorod and Pskov may highlight even more deeply rooted religious and cultural animosity.^[23]: 106

During the Livonian War (1558–83), European powers, particularly Poland-Lithuania and the Livonian German cities, intensified their negative perception of Russia. They imposed embargoes on war supplies to Russia, fearing the possibility of it receiving military supplies from England, which had an active trade mission in Russia. Queen Elizabeth denied the accusations.^{[23]: 106–107}

Contemporaries described the Tsardom of Russia and early Russian Empire as a barbaric enemy of Christianity. Accounts by Western travelers like Austrian Ambassador Sigismund von Herberstein and English Ambassador Giles Fletcher in the 16th century portrayed Russia in a negative light, focusing on aspects like superstition, brutality, and backwardness. Negative views persisted into the 17th and 18th centuries, with Western observers continuing to highlight aspects like superstition, drunkenness, and barbaric practices in Russian society. Notable figures like Captain John Perry and French travelers Jacques Margeret and Jean Chappe d'Auteroche contributed to these perceptions, often comparing Russian society unfavorably with Western standards.^{[23]: 107–109}

On 19 October 1797, the French Directory received a document from a Polish general, Michał Sokolnicki, entitled "Aperçu sur la Russie". This forgery is known as the so-called "The Will of Peter the Great" and was first published in October 1812, during the Napoleonic wars, in Charles Louis-Lesur's much-read Des progrès de la puissance russe: this was at the behest of Napoleon I, who ordered a series of articles to be published showing that "Europe is inevitably in the process of becoming booty for Russia".^[25][26] Subsequent to the Napoleonic wars, propaganda against Russia was continued by Napoleon's former confessor, Dominique Georges-Frédéric de Pradt, who in a series of books portrayed Russia as a power-grasping "barbaric" power hungry to conquer Europe.^[27] With reference to Russia's new constitutional laws in 1811 the Savoyard philosopher Joseph de Maistre wrote the now famous statement: "Every nation gets the government it deserves" ("Toute nation a le gouvernement qu'elle mérite").^[28][29]

Beginning from 1815 and lasting roughly until 1840, British commentators began criticizing the perceived conservatism of the Russian state and its resistance to reform efforts.^[30] In 1836, The Westminster Review attributed growth of British navy to "Ministers [that] are smitten with the epidemic disease of Russo-phobia".^[31] However, Russophobia in Britain for the rest of the 19th century was primarily related to British fears that the Russian conquest of Central Asia was a precursor to an attack on British-colonized India. These fears led to the "Great Game", a series of political and diplomatic confrontations between Britain and Russia during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.^[32]

In 1843 the Marquis de Custine published his hugely successful 1800-page, four-volume travelogue La Russie en 1839. Custine's scathing narrative reran what were by now clichés which presented Russia as a place where "the veneer of European civilization was too thin to be credible". Such was its huge success that several official and pirated editions quickly followed, as well as condensed versions and translations in German, Dutch, and English. By 1846 approximately 200 thousand copies had been sold.^[33]

In 1867, Fyodor Tyutchev, a Russian poet, diplomat and member of His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancellery, introduced the actual term of "russophobia" in a letter to his daughter Anna Aksakova on 20 September 1867,^{[citation needed]} where he applied it to a number of pro-Western Russian liberals who, pretending that they were merely following their liberal principles, developed a negative attitude towards their own country and always stood on a pro-Western and anti-Russian position, regardless of any changes in the Russian society and having a blind eye on any violations of these principles in the West, "violations in the sphere of justice, morality, and even civilization". He put the emphasis on the irrationality of this sentiment.^[34] Tyutchev saw Western anti-Russian sentiment as the result of misunderstanding caused by civilizational differences between East and West.^[35]

Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party regarded Slavic peoples (especially Poles and East Slavs) as non-Aryan Untermenschen (subhumans).^[36] As early as 1925, Hitler suggested in Mein Kampf that the German people needed Lebensraum ("living space") to achieve German expansion eastwards (Drang nach Osten) at the expense of the inferior Slavs. Hitler believed that "the organization of a Russian state formation was not the result of the political abilities of the Slavs in Russia, but only a wonderful example of the state-forming efficacity of the German element in an inferior race."^[37]

After the invasion of the Soviet Union, Hitler expressed his plans for the Slavs:

As for the ridiculous hundred million Slavs, we will mold the best of them as we see fit, and we will isolate the rest of them in their pig-styes; and anyone who talks about cherishing the local inhabitants and civilizing them, goes straight off into a concentration camp!^[38]

Plans to eliminate Russians and other Slavs from Soviet territory to allow German settlement included starvation. American historian Timothy D. Snyder maintains that there were 4.2 million victims of the German Hunger Plan in the Soviet Union, "largely Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians," including 3.1 million Soviet POWs and 1.0 million civilian deaths in the Siege of Leningrad.^[39] According to Snyder, Hitler intended eventually to exterminate up to 45 million Slavs by planned famine as part of Generalplan Ost.^[40]

Influenced by the guidelines, in a directive sent out to the troops under his command, General Erich Hoepner of the 4th Panzer Army stated:

The war against Russia is an important chapter in the German nation's struggle for existence. It is the old battle of the Germanic against the Slavic people, of the defense of European culture against Muscovite-Asiatic inundation and the repulse of Jewish Bolshevism. The objective of this battle must be the demolition of present-day Russia and must, therefore, be conducted with unprecedented severity. Every military action must be guided in planning and execution by an iron resolution to exterminate the enemy remorselessly and totally. In particular, no adherents of the contemporary Russian Bolshevik system are to be spared.^[41]

Russophobic stereotypes of an illiberal tradition were also favored by Cold War historiographers, even as scholars of early Russia debunked such essentialist notions.^[42]

Widely criticized for being antisemitic and extremist nationalistic, Igor Shafarevich's 1981 work Russophobia^[43] blamed "Jews seeking world rule" for alleged "vast conspiracy against Russia and all mankind" and seeking destruction of Russia through adoption of a Western-style democracy.^[44]

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the collapse of Communism, anti-Russian sentiment in the United States was at an all-time low. However, it has experienced a resurgence during the late 1990s due to Russia's opposition to the enlargement of NATO. According to a Gallup poll, 59% of surveyed Americans viewed Russia negatively in 1999, compared to 25% in 1991.^[45]

Anatol Lieven considered the Western commentary on the Second Chechen War and a Russian reaction to eastward NATO enlargement to be the main cause of growing Russophobia in the 90s. Condemning the brutality of the Russian army and an exaggerated fear of NATO, he argued that the influence of the § Cold War elites and ethnic lobbies, coupled with 19th century stereotypes about Russian expansionism led Western journalists and intellectuals to drop professional standards and engage in propaganda, spreading Russophobia and national hatred.^[12] In April 2007, David Johnson, founder of the Johnson's Russia List, said in interview to the Moscow News: "I am sympathetic to the view that these days Putin and Russia are perhaps getting too dark a portrayal in most Western media. Or at least that critical views need to be supplemented with other kinds of information and analysis. An openness to different views is still warranted."^[46] California-based international relations scholar Andrei Tsygankov has remarked that anti-Russian political rhetoric coming from Washington circles has received wide echo in American mainstream media, asserting that "Russophobia's revival is indicative of the fear shared by some U.S. and European politicians that their grand plans to control the world's most precious resources and geostrategic sites may not succeed if Russia's economic and political recovery continues."^[47] In contrast, Krystyna Kurczab-Redlich and some other reporters active in Chechnya alarmed already in early 2000s that Putin's true nature and intentions have been exposed by the Russian atrocities during the Second Chechen War as by no means resembling those of a Western democrat. It was, however, convenient for the Western elites to brand these reports as Russophobic and disregard them, in spite of such reports being delivered also by Anna Politkovskaya, a Russian journalist and human rights activist, later assassinated.^[48][49] The first among these views has ultimately suffered utter discreditation in a humiliating manner after 2014, primarily because it was inherently flawed as it focused exclusively on the fantastic motivations behind anti-Russian sentiment in Western Europe, while entirely disregarding the precisely specified reasons of negative views of Russia in Central and Eastern Europe which stem in turn from real experience and knowledge.^[50][51][52]

In October 2004, the International Gallup Organization announced that according to its poll, anti-Russia sentiment remained fairly strong throughout Europe and the West in general. It found that Russia was the least popular G-8 country globally. Overall, the percentage of respondents with a positive view of Russia was only 31%.^[53]

Anti-Russian sentiment in the United States and Western European countries decreased during the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev, with about half of respondents in US, UK, Germany, Spain and France having positive views of Russia in 2011. It began to increase again after 2012.^[16] The Transatlantic Trends 2012 Report indicated that "views of Russia turned from favorable to unfavorable on both sides of the Atlantic", noting that most Americans and Europeans, as well as many Russians, said that they were not confident that the election results expressed the will of voters.^[54]

Attitudes towards Russia in most countries worsened considerably following Russia's annexation of Crimea, the subsequent fomenting of the 2014 pro-Russian unrest in Ukraine and its intervention in the resulting War in Donbas. From 2013 to 2014, the median negative attitudes in Europe rose from 54% to 75%, and from 43% to 72% in the United States. Negative attitudes also rose compared to 2013 throughout the Middle East, Latin America, Asia and Africa.^[15]

According to political scientist Peter Schulze, the accusations of collusion with Trump campaign, coupled with the criminal case of Lisa F., which was reported in Germany as an instance of Russia's hybrid war, sparked fears that the Kremlin could meddle in German campaigns as well, resulting in growth of anti-Russian sentiment in Germany after 2016.^[55]

By the summer of 2020, majority of Western nations had unfavorable views of Russia, with the exception of Italy, which was attributed by Pew Research Center to a delivery of medical aid by Moscow early during the pandemic.^[16]

85% of Americans polled by Gallup between 1 and 17 February 2022 had an unfavorable view of Russia.^[45]

There was a sharp uptick in manifestations of anti-Russian sentiment after the beginning of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine;^[56][57] following the start of the invasion, anti-Russian sentiment soared across the Western world.^{[54][58][59][60][61]} Since the invasion commenced, ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking immigrants from post-Soviet states are globally reporting rising instances of open hostility and discrimination towards them.^[19][18] This hostility is not just towards Russian people; it has also been seen directed towards businesses as well.^[62]

Several EU countries, such as Finland, Poland, the Czech Republic and the Baltic states, have suspended granting visas to Russian citizens,^[63] complicating their emigration from Russia.^[64] According to the EU directive from 2022, member states should not accept visa applications from Russians in a third country.^[65]

A "pervasive climate of distrust" towards Russian passport holders in Europe and rejections of bank account applications because of nationality were reported.^[66] United Kingdom limited how much Russian nationals are allowed to save on bank accounts. The banking industry considered the restriction to violate UK equality laws, which forbid discrimination by nationality.^[67] Leonid Gozman called European restrictions discriminatory and said that they harmed dissidents who were forced to leave Russia, leaving them without means to survive.^[68]

Outrage was caused by pro-war demonstrations held in Athens, Berlin, Dublin, Hanover, Frankfurt and Limassol, consisting of "vehicles emblazoned with the pro-war Z symbol and marches attended by hundreds of flag-waving nationalists". Experts surveyed by The Times said that the rallies were likely coordinated by the Kremlin via the soft power Rossotrudnichestvo agency, stressing that a "bottom-up element" of support for Russia also exists.^[69]

By 2023, the most negative perception of Russia was in Ukraine (net negative 79%), followed by Portugal with 69%, Japan with 68%, and Poland with 68%, according to the 2023 Democracy Perception Index.^[70]

On 6 February 2025, Czech President Petr Pavel signed a bill that prohibits Russian nationals from obtaining Czech citizenship, ^[71] even if they have lived in the Czech Republic for a long time, which critics say is discriminatory and contrary to European values. Some European countries, such as the Netherlands, have taken the exact opposite step due to the war in Ukraine, allowing Russians living in the Netherlands to obtain Dutch citizenship without having to travel to Russia and renounce their Russian citizenship.^[72]

The Russian government and its supporters are sometimes criticised for using allegations of "Russophobia" as a form of propaganda to counter criticism of government policy.^[73][22] Sources critical of the Russian government claim that it is Russian state-owned media and administration who attempt to discredit the "neutral" criticism by generalizing it into indiscriminate accusations of the whole Russian population – or Russophobia.^[22][74][75] In 2006, poet and essayist Lev Rubinstein wrote that similarly to the term "fascism", the term "Russophobia" has become a political sticker slapped onto people who disagree with words or actions of people or organizations who position themselves as "Russian ones" in the ideological, rather than an ethnic or geographical sense.^[76]

Russian responses to outside anti-Russian criticism has intensified the growth of contemporary Russian nationalist ideology, which in many ways mirrors its predecessor, Soviet nationalism.^[22][77] Sociologist Anatoly Khazanov states that there's a national-patriotic movement which believes that there's a "clash of civilizations, a global struggle between the materialistic, individualistic, consumerist, cosmopolitan, corrupt, and decadent West [ru] led by the United States and the idealist, collectivist, morally and spiritually superior Eurasia led by Russia."^[78] In their view, the United States wants to break up Russia and turn it into a source of raw materials. The West being accused of Russophobia is a major part of their beliefs.^[79]

Joseph Stiglitz wrote that these attitudes are reinforced by the failure of the post-Soviet liberal economic reforms, which are perceived to have been influenced by the US Treasury.^[80] A mismatch between U.S. rhetoric about promoting democratic reforms in Russia and actual U.S. actions and policy has been said to cause deep resentment among Russians, helping Russian propaganda to construct a narrative of U.S. malign interference.^[81]

Since the 2014 annexation of Crimea and subsequent sanctions, there was a rapid growth of charges of Russophobia in the official discourse. Use of the term on the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website rose dramatically during the period between 2014 and 2018.^[82] Russian President Vladimir Putin compared Russophobia to antisemitism.^[83][84][85] Academic Jade McGlynn considered conflation of modern Russophobia and Nazi antisemitism to be a part of propaganda strategy that uses historical framing to create a flattering narrative that the Russo-Ukrainian War is a restaging of the Great Patriotic War.^[86][87] Kathryn Stoner and Michael McFaul explained the turn to radical nationalism as a strategy to preserve the regime within domestic economical and political pressures, claiming that "To maintain his argument for legitimacy at home, Putin needs... constant confrontation that supports the narrative that Russia is under siege from the West, that Russia is at war with the United States."^[20]

A Russian political scientist and a senior visiting fellow at the George Washington University Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies Maria Lipman said that this narrative was made more convincing by imposing sanctions on Russia and supporting Ukraine with weapons, as well as by statements about weakening Russia made by American establishment, amplified on Russian television.^[88]

The Washington Post reported effectiveness of using the label of "Russophobia" by Russian propaganda to sustain support for the invasion of Ukraine by presenting it as an existential confrontation with the West. According to an independent polling agency, "people explain that a significant part of the world is against us and it's only Putin who hopes to hold onto Russia, otherwise we would be eaten up completely. To them it is Russia that is defending itself".^[21]

Democracy Perception Index 2024[89][90] "What is your overall perception of Russia?" (default-sorted by decreasing negativity of each country)
Country polled	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Difference
Ukraine	2%	89%	9%	-87
Japan	2%	77%	21%	-75
Poland	8%	78%	14%	-71
Portugal	7%	77%	16%	-70
Sweden	8%	77%	15%	-68
Denmark	10%	73%	17%	-63
France	8%	69%	23%	-61
Netherlands	10%	66%	24%	-56
United Kingdom	11%	67%	22%	-55
Austria	12%	67%	21%	-55
Belgium	12%	65%	23%	-53
Germany	12%	65%	23%	-52
Spain	13%	66%	21%	-52
Canada	13%	63%	24%	-51
Ireland	14%	64%	22%	-50
Italy	10%	60%	30%	-50
Australia	13%	60%	27%	-47
Switzerland	14%	60%	26%	-45
Brazil	17%	56%	27%	-39
Norway	21%	58%	21%	-37
Romania	16%	53%	31%	-36
United States	17%	50%	33%	-33
Iran	16%	48%	36%	-32
South Korea	22%	52%	26%	-30
Hungary	17%	45%	38%	-28
Israel	27%	50%	23%	-23
Chile	22%	41%	37%	-19
Argentina	21%	39%	40%	-18
Greece	25%	41%	34%	-16
Colombia	22%	37%	41%	-14
Taiwan	25%	36%	39%	-11
Singapore	31%	33%	36%	-2
Venezuela	27%	26%	47%	+1
South Africa	34%	32%	34%	+1
Thailand	28%	23%	49%	+5
Turkey	34%	27%	39%	+7
Kenya	40%	27%	33%	+13
Philippines	36%	22%	42%	+14
Mexico	38%	22%	40%	+16
Peru	41%	25%	34%	+16
Malaysia	37%	19%	44%	+18
Indonesia	39%	11%	50%	+28
Saudi Arabia	45%	15%	40%	+29
Morocco	44%	15%	41%	+30
Hong Kong	54%	21%	25%	+33
Nigeria	55%	20%	25%	+35
Egypt	57%	11%	32%	+45
Pakistan	59%	11%	30%	+48
China	56%	7%	37%	+48
Algeria	60%	6%	34%	+53
India	64%	11%	25%	+53
Vietnam	66%	8%	26%	+58
Russia	84%	6%	10%	+78

After Nicholas II intensified russification policies and did not provide significant opposition to the Ottoman Empire's massacres against Armenians, anti-Russian sentiment among Armenian nationalist groups rose. After the Russian government confiscated Armenian Church lands in 1903, this led to attacks on Russian authorities and Armenians who cooperated with them by Armenians mobilised by the ARF party.^[91]

In July 1988, during the Karabakh movement, the killing of an Armenian man and the injury of tens of others by the Soviet army in a violent clash at Zvartnots Airport near Yerevan sparked anti-Russian and anti-Soviet demonstrations.^[92] In 2015, relations between Armenia and Russia were strained after the massacre of an Armenian family of 7 in Gyumri by a Russian serviceman, stationed at the Russian base there.^[93][94]

Relations between Armenia and Russia have worsened in recent years, due to Russia's refusal to help Armenia in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war and the September 2022 Armenia–Azerbaijan clashes,^[95] as well as due to statements perceived to be anti-Armenian made by figures close to Russian President Vladimir Putin.^[96] This has resulted in anti-Russian sentiment rising sharply in the country.^[97]

The 1990 Black January massacre prior to Azerbaijani independence and Russia's complicated role in the First Nagorno-Karabakh War between Azerbaijan and Armenia increased the negative perception of Russia.^[98] Under Abulfaz Elchibey's presidency in 1992–93, relations between Russia and Azerbaijan were damaged due to his anti-Russian policies,^[99] however under Ilham Aliyev, relations instead improved.^[100]

There has been increased animosity towards Russians in Tbilisi after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, which has also been directed towards exiled Russians who recently fled their home country. It has included signs from businesses and posts from Airbnb hosts declaring “Russians not welcome”, anti-Russian graffiti found on many central streets, the famous Bassiani nightclub banning anyone with a Russian passport, and an online petition signed by thousands of locals demanding tougher immigration rules for Russians.^[101][102]

Accordingly, in March 2022 a strong majority of 84% of respondents to a Georgian poll said Russia is the enemy of Georgia,^[103] a sharp uptick compared with a decade earlier. According to a 2012 poll, 35% of Georgians perceived Russia as Georgia's biggest enemy.^[104] Furthermore, in a February 2013 poll a majority of 63% said Russia is Georgia's biggest political and economic threat as opposed to 35% of those who looked at Russia as the most important partner for Georgia.^[105] In November 2023, 11% preferred closer ties with Russia, while abandoning western ties, and 25% wanted to deepen ties with Russia.^[106]

The root of the Georgian anti-Russian sentiment lies in the history of Russian colonialism of Transcaucasia. For Georgians, the country was twice occupied and annexed by Russia. First in 1801 under the Tsarist regime, and then, after a short interlude of independence of the Democratic Republic of Georgia (1918–1921), a 70-year period of forceful Soviet occupation.^[107] This sentiment was further fed by the events of the 1990s, when Russia supported the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two historically inalienable parts of Georgia, causing the Abkhaz–Georgian conflict, the Georgian–Ossetian conflict and later the war with Russia in 2008.^[108] It was also followed by Georgian sympathy to the Chechens during the Chechen–Russian conflict of the 1990s.^[109]

In a 2012 survey, the percentage of Russian immigrants in the EU that indicated that they had experienced racially motivated hate crimes was 5%, which is less than the average of 10% reported by several groups of immigrants and ethnic minorities in the EU.^[110] 17% of Russian immigrants in the EU said that they had been victims of crimes in the preceding 12 months, as compared to an average of 24% among several groups of immigrants and ethnic minorities.^[111]

In 2015, the chairman of the Russian State Duma's Foreign Affairs Committee Aleksey Pushkov claimed that Russophobia had become the state policy in the Baltic states^[112] and in 2021 Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov accused the Baltic states of being "the leaders of the Russophobic minority" in NATO and the European Union.^[113] However, EUvsDisinfo has documented the claim of Russophobia in the Baltic states as a recurring narrative that is part of the Kremlin disinformation campaign.^[114]

This section may be unbalanced towards certain viewpoints. Please improve the article or discuss the issue on the talk page. (August 2021)

A poll conducted by Gallup International suggested that 34% Estonians have a positive attitude towards Russia, but it is supposed that survey results were likely impacted by a large ethnic Russian minority in the country.^[53] However, in a 2012 poll only 3% of the Russian minority in Estonia reported that they had experienced a hate crime (as compared to an average of 10% among ethnic minorities and immigrants in EU).^[110]

According to Estonian philosopher Jaan Kaplinski, the birth of anti-Russian sentiment in Estonia dates back to 1940, as there was little or none during the czarist and first independence period, when anti-German sentiment predominated. Kaplinski states the imposition of Soviet rule under Joseph Stalin in 1940 and subsequent actions by Soviet authorities led to the replacement of anti-German sentiment with anti-Russian sentiment within just one year, and characterized it as "one of the greatest achievements of the Soviet authorities".^[115] Kaplinski supposes that anti-Russian sentiment could disappear as quickly as anti-German sentiment did in 1940, however he believes the prevailing sentiment in Estonia is sustained by Estonia's politicians who employ "the use of anti-Russian sentiments in political combat," together with the "tendentious attitude of the [Estonian] media."^[115] Kaplinski says that a "rigid East-West attitude is to be found to some degree in Estonia when it comes to Russia, in the form that everything good comes from the West and everything bad from the East";^[115] this attitude, in Kaplinski's view, "probably does not date back further than 1940 and presumably originates from Nazi propaganda."^[115]

According to The Moscow Times, Latvia's fears of Russia are rooted in recent history, including conflicting views on whether Latvia and other Baltic states were occupied by the USSR or joined it voluntarily, as well as the 1940–1941 June and 1949 March deportations that followed and more recently the annexation of Crimea that fueled a fear that Latvia could also be annexed by Russia.^[116] Russian-American journalist and broadcaster Vladimir Pozner believed the fact that many Russian migrants in the Latvian SSR did not learn Latvian and expected the local population to speak Russian also contributed to an accumulation of anti-Russian sentiment.^[117]

No Russians have ever been killed or even wounded for political, nationalistic or racist reasons in Latvia ever since it regained its independence^{[118][119][120]} and in a 2012 poll only 2% of the Russian minority in Latvia reported having experienced a 'racially' motivated hate crime (as compared to an average of 10% among immigrants and minorities in EU).^[110] An earlier 2004 research "Ethnic tolerance and integration of the Latvian society" by the Baltic Institute of Social Sciences found that Latvian respondents on average rated their relations with Russians 7.8 out of 10, whereas non-Latvian respondents rated their relationship with Latvians 8.4 out of 10. Both groups believed that the ties between them were satisfactory, had not changed in the last five years and were to either remain the same or improve in the next five years. 66% of non-Russian respondents said they would also support their son or daughter marrying an ethnic Russian. Respondents did mention some ethnic conflicts, but all of them were classified as psycholinguistic such as verbal confrontations.^[121]

Occasionally, Russians in Latvia have been targeted by anti-Russian rhetoric from some of the more radical members of both the mainstream and radical right parties in Latvia. In 2010, Civic Union's internal e-mail correspondence between Minister for Foreign Affairs of Latvia Ģirts Valdis Kristovskis and Latvian American doctor and party member Aivars Slucis was leaked.^[122] In one of the e-mails titled "Do Latvians Surrender?"^[123] Slucis complained of the current situation in Latvia and being unable to return and work in Latvia, because he would not be able to treat Russians in the same way as Latvians.^[123][124] Kristovskis agreed with his opinion and evaluation,^[123] but warned against hysterical responses, cautioning party members to avoid discussions counterproductive to the party's political goals. After the leak the Civic Union ousted Slucis from the party for views unacceptable to the party and returned his financial contributions, while the opposition parties Harmony Centre and For a Good Latvia initiated an unsuccessful vote of no confidence against Kristovskis.^[124][123]

On the other hand, the results of a yearly poll by the research agency "SKDS" showed that the population of Latvia was more split on its attitude towards the Russian Federation. In 2008, 47 percent of respondents had a positive view of Russia and 33% had a negative one, while the remaining 20 percent found it hard to define their opinion. It peaked in 2010 when 64 percent of respondents felt positive towards Russia, in comparison with the 25 percent that felt negative. In 2015, following the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, however, it dropped to the lowest level since 2008 and for the first time, the people with a negative attitude towards Russia (46%) surpassed people with a positive attitude (41%).^[125] 43.5 percent also believed Russia posed a military threat to Latvia and even in 2019 that number had decreased only slightly and stood at 37.3 percent.^[126]

Due to Soviet occupation, there is a concern in Lithuania that Russia might want to subjugate the Baltics again, especially after the Russian annexation of Crimea.^[127] There are also concerns over Russia's increasing military deployment, such as in the Russian region of Kaliningrad, an exclave of Russia bordering Lithuania.^[128][129]

According to a poll conducted in February 2022, just before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, 83% of Lithuanians had a negative opinion of Russia.^[130] This number increased to 90% later that year.^[130] In 2024, a survey suggested that 70% of Lithuanians think that Russia poses a real threat.^[131]

Anti-Russian sentiment dates back to the conflict between the Russian and Ottoman empires in the 18th and early 19th centuries and the ceding of part of the Moldavian principality to Russia by the Ottoman Empire in 1812 after its de facto annexation, and to the annexations during World War II and after by the Soviet Union of Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia and the policies of ethnic cleansing, Russification and deportations that have taken place in those territories against ethnic Romanians. Following WWII, Romania, a former ally of Nazi Germany, was occupied by Soviet forces. Soviet dominance over the Romanian economy was manifested through the so-called Sovroms, exacting a tremendous economic toll ostensibly as war-time reparations.^{[132][133][134][135]}

The emergence of anti-Russian sentiment in the Danubian Principalities, the precursors to unified Romania which became independent of the Ottoman Empire with the 1829 Treaty of Adrianople concluding the 1828–1829 Russo-Turkish War, arose from the post-1829 relationship of the Danubian Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia to Russia, and was caused by mutually economic and political grievances of two influential classes that were often odds also with each other. As per the 1829 treaty, Russia was named the protector of the two principalities, allowed to occupy them, and also drafted a quasi-constitution known as the Organic Regulations which formed a powerful assembly of 800 boyars (the local landowning economic elite) nominally under the authority of the less nominal prince, the document crafted with strong support from the boyars. The boyars, a "reactionary oligarchy" as described by Misha Glenny, stopped short any hint of liberal reform, and the growing urban elite began to associate Russia with the slow progress of reform and the obstacles they faced in building an industrial base. On the other hand, the boyars themselves began to sour on Russia during the 1830s and 1840s due to their economic conflict of interest with Russia. After the Ottomans withdrew from the three forts along the Danube basin, the boyars exploited the highly fertile land to drastically increase Romanian wheat production, such that eventually future Romania consisting of Wallachia unified with Moldavia would become the fourth-largest wheat producer in the world. Whereas before 1829 Wallachian and Moldavian wheat had been limited to Ottoman markets, Russia increasingly felt threatened by growing competition in its jurisdiction that it feared could drive down the price of Russian wheat. Accordingly, Russia exploited its role as protector of the Principalities to let the Danube silt up, sabotaging the possible market competitor. As a result of this as well as "Russian foot-dragging on the economy", the boyars too became increasingly resentful of Russian domination. The rapid erosion of public relations with Russia led to a revolution in 1848, in which the newly emerging Romanian intellectual and political class sought the help of the Ottomans, their old hegemon, to drive out Russian influence—although, after pressure applied by Russia, the Russian and Ottoman armies joined forces to squash the movement.^[136]

In 2004, the leader of the marginal Svoboda party Oleh Tyahnybok urged his party to fight "the Moscow-Jewish mafia" ruling Ukraine.^[137] For these remarks Tyahnybok was expelled from the Our Ukraine parliamentary faction in July 2004.^[138] The former coordinator of Right Sector in West Ukraine, Oleksandr Muzychko talked about fighting "communists, Jews and Russians for as long as blood flows in my veins."^[139]

In May 2009, a poll held by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in Ukraine said that 96% of respondents were positive about Russians as an ethnic group, 93% respected the Russian Federation and 76% respected the Russian establishment.^[140]

In October 2010, statistics by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Science of Ukraine said that positive attitudes towards Russians have been decreasing since 1994. In response to a question gauging tolerance of Russians, 15% of Western Ukrainians responded positively. In Central Ukraine, 30% responded positively (from 60% in 1994); 60% responded positively in Southern Ukraine (from 70% in 1994); and 64% responded positively in Eastern Ukraine (from 75% in 1994). Furthermore, 6–7% of Western Ukrainians would banish Russians entirely from Ukraine, and 7–8% in Central Ukraine responded similarly. This level of sentiment was not found in Southern or Eastern Ukraine.^[141]

The ultranationalist party Svoboda (once prominent, but now marginal),^{[142][143][144]} has invoked radical anti-Russian rhetoric^[145] and has electoral support enough to garner majority support in local councils,^[146] as seen in the Ternopil regional council in Western Ukraine.^[147] Analysts explained Svoboda's victory in Eastern Galicia during the 2010 Ukrainian local elections as a result of the policies of the Azarov Government who were seen as too pro-Russian by the voters of "Svoboda".^[148][149] According to Andreas Umland, Senior Lecturer in Political Science at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy,^[150] Svoboda's increasing exposure in the Ukrainian media has contributed to these successes.^[151] According to British academic Taras Kuzio the presidency of Viktor Yanukovich (2010–2014) fabricated this exposure in order to discredit the opposition.^[152] Since the Euromaidan revolution, the Svoboda party lost a lot of its support. In the 2019 Ukrainian parliamentary election Svoboda formed a united party list with the Governmental Initiative of Yarosh, Right Sector and National Corps.^[153] The united list received only 2.15% of the votes, less than half of the 5% election threshold, and thus no parliamentary seats via the national party list.^[154]

According to the Brookings Institution after Ukraine regained its independence, only a small minority of nationalists expressed strong anti-Russian views; the majority hoped to have good relations with Russia. In 2014, after the Russian annexation of Crimea, the attitude to Russia changed sharply. In April 2017, a poll by Sociological group "RATING" found that 57% of respondents expressed a "very cold" or "cold" attitude toward Russia while 17% expressed a "very warm" or "warm" attitude.^[155] In February 2019, 77% of Ukrainians had a positive attitude towards Russians, 57% of Ukrainians had a positive view of Russia, but only 13% of Ukrainians had positive attitude towards the Russian government.^[156]

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, sentiments towards Russia have enormously declined. In March 2022, 97% of Ukrainians said they had an unfavourable view of Russian President Putin, with a further 81% saying they had a very unfavourable or somewhat unfavourable view of the Russian people. However, 65% of Ukrainians agreed that "despite our differences there is more that unites ethnic Russians living in Ukraine and Ukrainians than divides us."^[157]

This change in public opinion has led to increased support for the removal of symbols of Russian culture in Ukraine, including monuments^[158] and streets^[159] named after notable Russians,^[160] along with limiting Russian literature and music.^[161] Since the invasion, Ukrainian cities demolished monuments to Russian writer Alexander Pushkin across the country,^[162] and there are also hundreds of renamed placenames due to their affiliation with Russia.^[163] Many streets in cities across Ukraine have also been renamed as a result of this, such as those that were formerly named after Russian historical figures like Tchaikovsky or Tolstoy.^[164] According to historian at the Ivan Franko National University of Lviv Vasyl Kmet [uk], this is being done to undo the Russian propaganda "of the so-called Russkiy Mir—the Russian-speaking world" by creating "a powerful alternative, a modern Ukrainian national discourse.”^[164]

Anti-Russian sentiment in the Czech Republic is largely a result of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 to suppress pro-democratic reforms during the Prague Spring and the subsequent 20 years of Soviet occupation.^[165] Before 1968, the Czechs were largely a Russophile nation and viewed Russia and the Soviet Union positively, as they had perceived Russia as a potential Slavic ally and protector from the German threat since the Czech National Revival in the 19th century and the Red Army liberated much of Czechoslovakia from Nazi German occupation in 1945. Czech historian Oldřich Tůma said that the consequences of the 1968 invasion can be seen "in the context of the war in Ukraine and the policy of the Czech government to support Ukraine, as well as in the widespread support of the Czech population towards Ukraine. It happened two generations ago, but it still has an impact on Czech opinion about Russia."^[166]

Russia remains continuously among the most negatively perceived countries among Czechs in polls conducted since 1991, and just 26% of Czechs responded that they had a positive opinion about Russia in November 2016.^{[167][168][169]}

According to writer Tim Nollen in 2008, Russians in Czechia were almost universally disliked as a people due in part to the presence of Russian mafiosi, as well as the "arrogant hordes of Russian visitors that descend upon Prague and the Spas in Karlovy Vary".^[170]

Following the start of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, anti-Russian tensions rose in the country.^[171][172] Martin Dlouhý, a professor at the Prague University of Economics and Business, wrote on Facebook on 24 February that he would not conduct, test, or correct the final thesis of Russian students