23rd Ohio Infantry Regiment

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The 23rd Ohio Infantry Regiment was an infantry regiment in the Union Army during much of the American Civil War. It served in the Eastern Theater in a variety of campaigns and battles, and is remembered with a stone memorial on the Antietam National Battlefield not far from Burnside's Bridge.^[1][2]

The regiment later became noted for its many up-and-coming politicians. Future presidents Rutherford B. Hayes and William McKinley served in this unit, as did future U.S. senator and associate justice of the United States Supreme Court Stanley Matthews and Robert P. Kennedy, a future U.S. Congressman. Other notable officers included James M. Comly and Eliakim P. Scammon, both of whom became influential nationally after the war. Harrison Gray Otis, the famed owner and publisher of the Los Angeles Times, also fought with the 23rd Ohio during the war. All told, before the regiment was mustered out at war's end, it had seen five generals serve in it.^[3]

Under the first call of President Abraham Lincoln, Ohio sent to the field 22 regiments of infantry, each having been enlisted for three months only. While these organizations organized for three months' service, Lincoln issued a call for a further 300,000 men for three years enlistment. Nearly all the companies which became the 23rd Ohio were then waiting to muster in for three months in different parts of Ohio.^[4] These·companies were the Bellefontaine Rifles from Logan County, the Cleveland Rifle Grenadiers with men from both Cleveland in Cuyahoga County and Wellington in Lorain County,^{[note 1]} the Ellsworth Guards from Ashland County, the Elyria Rifle Guards from Lorain County, the Galion Guards of Crawford County, Giddings's Zouaves from Ashtabula County,^{[note 2]} the Ohio Union Savers from Lake County, the Poland Guards from eastern Mahoning County, Ohio,^{[note 3]} the Welker Guards from Holmes and Ashland Counties, and the Zouave Light Guards from Cuyahoga County.^[9] These units were ordered to Camp Chase, near Columbus, and were re-enlisted for three years and assigned to the regiment.^[10] This made the 23rd Regiment the first three-year Ohio Volunteer Infantry regiment organized.^[11] Governor William Dennison soon gave commissions to several of the officers of the volunteer companies.^[12] The regiment mustered into duty on Tuesday, June 11, 1861, by Capt. Howard Stansberry, USA, as a three-year regiment.^[13]

Its 950 enlistees were originally led by Col. William Rosecrans.^[14] The other initial field officers were Lieutenant-Colonel Stanley Mathews and Major Rutherford B. Hayes, however, changes in the field/staff came quickly. That Friday, June 14, Rosecrans was promoted to Brigadier-General in the regular army.^[15] Wisely opting not to be promoted above their experience and ability, Matthews and Hayes asked for another regular officer to take command. In late June, 1837 West Point graduate and Mexican-American War veteran, Col. Eliakim P. Scammon succeeded Rosecrans in command.^[16] As well as the colonel and lieutenant-colonel, the quartermaster and adjutant were also promoted and transferred. They were replaced by promotions from the regiment, except for Major James M. Comly, who was transferred from the 63d Ohio.^[15] Hayes was promoted to lieutenant-colonel.^[13]

The 18-year-old Poland, Ohio resident, McKinley quickly adapted to army life and also wrote a series of letters to his hometown newspaper extolling the army and the Union cause.^[17] While at Camp Chase, their first shipment of official clothing contained only undershirts and drawers followed later by full uniforms. These delays in issuance of uniforms and weapons again brought the men into conflict with their officers, but recently appointed Major Hayes convinced them to accept what the government had issued them; his style in dealing with the men impressed McKinley, beginning an association and friendship that would last until Hayes's death in 1893.^[18] A few weeks later, though, the men were further disappointed when their first issue of arms were flintlock muskets on July 23. After much effort by the staff, the men accepted the arms.^[19]

After training and drilling following their induction, on Thursday, July 25, 1861, the regiment was ordered to Clarksburg, for western Virginia, where it arrived by train on Saturday. It served for several months in this area of current West Virginia, helping to restore that portion of Virginia to the Union. The 23rd Ohio was attached to Jacob D. Cox's Kanawha Brigade and served throughout much of the war in what became the IX Corps.

Ordered to garrison the town of Weston, roughly 20 miles (32 km) away, the 23rd Ohio marched for two days through heavy rain followed by an intense heat. Scammon continually chided his raw recruits for their slow pace and for discarding equipment en route.^{[10][note 4]} Shortly after arrival, Scammon was ordered to divide his command into two battalions of five companies to better counter the partisan threat. One battalion under Lt. Col. Mathews as a movable force, dedicated to counterinsurgency that was sent a further 20 miles (32 km) south to the vicinity of Bulltown and Sutton, under Matthews. The remaining battalion of five companies stayed at Weston with Scammon sending out occasional foraging and scouting expeditions against guerrillas and other disaffected inhabitants.^[16] This division of force elicited no response from the Rebel military who had suffered crushing defeats in the in western Virginia and opted not to devote many resources to what they deemed an area of relatively limited value.^[16]

In this area, the 23rd Ohio operated against numerous secessionist guerrillas there, performing hard duty, marching and countermarching over the rugged mountainous terrain drenched by almost continuous rain.^[21] Despite not being in the main theater of the war, life for the men in the regiment was often vicious and dangerous. It was an unpleasant constabulary duty that lacked the military glory many had sought to experience. They found the locals divided in their loyalties, with many serving in both Confederate and U. S. armies^[22] The 23rd Ohio was soon in a constant mode of incessant patrols chasing small bands of secessionist guerilla whose actions kept U.S. forces tied down and anxious.^{[10][note 5]}

Hope for real action rose in mid-August when Scammon was ordered south to join Rosecrans force assembling to counter a Rebel offensive in the Kanawha Valley. This valley and county was the center of the slavery in what would soon be West Virginia.^{[note 6]} The salt industry had brought slavery into the mountains and made slave-owners extremely wealthy and politically powerful.^[24] The wealth of the slave owners and their dominance of the economy gave them a sense of entitlement when it came to local politics and laws requiring bonds to be posted before running for office as a nominal anti-corruption matter negated the gains of universal white suffrage in 1851.^[25] Due to the vocal unionist majority in the region, the local slave-owning elite had raised militia companies to assert political control over the county and when few volunteers responded to their calls for resistance to Federal forces entering the region, they appealed to Richmond to maintain their political control. This Rebel force, under former Virginia governor Henry A. Wise, entered the valley and immediately began asserting arresting Unionists and destroying their property.^[25] After winning the Battle of Scary Creek, Wise found himself facing greater enemy numbers and suffered a strategic defeat as he withdrew 100 miles (160 km) southeast to Greenbrier County.^[26]

In September, the Confederacy again tried to wrest control of the valley from the United States. In this part of then Virginia, the Carnifex Ferry was a key part of the major roads in the area. This ferry operated 8 miles (13 km) southwest of Summersville. It was, for many miles, practically the only crossing along the rugged Gauley River. ^[27] In 1861, it was 370 feet in width and crossed by means of two flatboats. The road from the crossing wound along the base of the cliffs on the north side.^[27] On August 12, 1861, Brig. Gen. John Buchanan Floyd, former Secretary of War and like Wise – a former governor of Virginia, had entered Lewisburg with troops raised largely in southwestern Virginia. Advised to hold the ferry, but warned to stay on the south bank, he crossed the Gauley on Wednesday evening, August 22 and on August 26, attacked and routed Col. Erastus B. Tyler's 7th Ohio Infantry encamped at Kessler's Cross Lanes.^[28][29] After this battle, he returned to fortify the ferry from where he planned to move against Rosecrans by occupying Summersville,^[27] and sent Col. John McCausland, with the 36th Virginia Infantry (Second Kanawha), occupied the town of Summersville.^[30]

Upon entering the valley after Wise's withdrawal, the men of the 23rd Ohio and their comrades had been warmly welcomed into the area by many local citizens reflecting the loyalty division.^[26] Sgt. McKinley's passage through the town of Sutton exposed him to the devastation neighbor had wrought upon neighbor with few civilians about many dwellings destroyed and those that were not occupied by Federal troops.^[31] On Sunday, September 1, Matthews and his five companies reunited with the regiment at Bulltown, and the 23rd Ohio left for Sutton to join Rosecrans's Army of West Virginia. The regiment was now part of an army of 8,000—eight infantry regiments, three mounted batteries, and three cavalry companies—under Rosecrans' command, with the 23rd serving as the commander's bodyguard.^[32]

Scammon took command of the 3rd Brigade composed of the 23rd and 30th Ohio regiments. Due to Matthews' absence, Hayes took command of the regiment.^[33] Leaving a garrison of around 3,000 men at Sutton, the following Saturday, September 7, the army moved south towards Summersville. Rosecrans' expedition moved out of Sutton with a squadron of cavalry in front followed by pioneers. Next in the van was Benham's 1st Brigade followed by McCook's 2nd Brigade. The 3rd Brigade was the last combat unit in the column.^[34] Per Rosecrans' direction, Scammon had detailed six companies of the 30th Ohio to guard the a wagon train that trailed out for five miles. ^[27]After a hard slog, Rosecrans had his men stop at Birch River Sunday evening where he received intelligence that Floyd was at the ferry.^[30]Late Monday morning, September 9, the march resumed and that night halted 8 miles (13 km) from Summersville, on Muddlety Creek, on the site of a former Confederate outpost.^[27]

As the 23rd Ohio and the Army of West Virginia approached, McCausland, recognizing he was isolated and outnumbered, had withdrawn to rejoin Floyd at the ferry on Sunday. Floyd now had about 2000 men in fortifications as the U.S. force of 5,000 approached.^[27] Scouts reported back to Rosecrans that the Rebels were still at the ferry.^[35]

At 4:00 am, on Tuesday, Rosecrans moved forward. The advance guard reached Summersville about 8:45 am.^[27] Near McKee's Creek Crossing was a road that led to Hughes Ferry on Gauley River, at the mouth of Salmon Run. McCook, with a cavalry escort, rode down to the river and was fired upon by a Confederate detachment. Four companies of the 10th Ohio then came to the rescue, and the ferry boat was secured and the march resumed. The road then led southwest to Kessler's Cross Lanes where Rosecrans paused 1 mile (1.6 km) from the crossroad for a short rest of short duration. He then sent Benham's 1st Brigade down the road leading from Cross Lanes to the ferry in line of battle, cautioning him not to bring on an engagement as while Floyd's general location was known, the disposition of his troops was not.^[27]

Meanwhile, Rosecrans climbed a steep hill to the right of the road, and with his field glass looked ahead of him. Far in front stood the 1st Brigade in line of battle, facing the river. The 2nd Brigade was on a slope to the left, and on the right, a little higher up, was the 3rd Brigade, containing the 23rd Ohio, in reserve facing the direction of the ferry.^[36].^[37][38] He could see the heights beyond the Gauley River.^[27] As Benham advanced, his men made contact with a Rebel detachment of the 50th Virginia Infantry camped along the road.^[39][27] The Confederates retired to the main camp, while Rosecrans, in ignorance of the true situation, ordered Benham to send the 10th Ohio's four companies, which were 1 mile (1.6 km)ahead of the main body, down the road from Hughes Ferry, to scout the Rebel position, and support Benham's advance.^[39]

Suddenly the Federal advance guard made contact with the Confederate line barely 300 yards away. With woods lining the road on both sides, except for a cornfield along one side for part of the distance, the Rebels opened a heavy fire on the U.S. forces, and the battle began.^[27] The fighting at the Battle of Carnifex Ferry was a hard but relatively minor scrap.^[40] The 1st and 2nd Brigades assaulted the Rebels in a series of attacks through the afternoon but could not dislodge them.^[27]

Col. Smith and his 13th Ohio had been sent down into a wooded ravine on a reconnaissance to find the Rebels' right flank.^[41] After deploying in line of battle, he moved up the slope through the brush until he saw the enemy breastworks. Keeping behind the woods and the crest of a ridge in front of the Rebel line, he slipped further left until his men came under fire from the end of Floyd's right flank 100 yards (91 m) away.^[42] After having his men drop flat on the ground and crawl up to the ridge's crest, his men opened a heavy fire on the enemy that drove the Confederates away. Since he had been ordered to find the right flank but not bring on an engagement, the 13th Ohio did not pursue the fleeing Rebels. After receiving Smith's his findings, Rosecrans put together an ad hoc brigade to make a flank attack out of the ravine in his left. At Rosecrans' order, Scammon sent Hayes and four companies to the right of the enemy's entrenchments, taking position in the dense thicket in the ravine.^[43] There they joined the 28th Ohio, eight companies of the 13th Ohio, and two of the 12th Ohio regiments, placed under Smith's command. He was ordered to carry the works on the right by assault.^{[27] [44]} Instructed to wait until dusk before launching the assault, the men waited in the woods that grew very dark quickly. The assault was bogged down by the darkness as the men struggled up the hill. After midnight, they reached the works and drove the Rebels back but the sheer exhaustion of being on the go for nearly 24 hours precluded further advance past the first entrenchments. The losses from the enemy fire, and some from friendly fire in the dark, were relatively light, but Hayes and his companies received their baptism of serious combat.^[40][43]

Initially uninvolved in the fighting, at 4:00 pm, Rosecrans ordered Scammon to form his brigade in line of battle on a hill fronting the Rebels' right.^[43] It was formed in two lines, the 23rd Ohio in front, and six companies of the 30th Ohio, in rear.^{[note 7]} Scammon placed Mack's Battery E, 4th U.S. Artillery of howitzers a little in advance of the infantry. At dusk, the 23rd was sent forward closer to the enemy works and to await further direction. An hour later, it was ordered back to its original position.^[43]

Although his men still held the north bank of the ferry, Floyd realized the folly of his crossing and his force was outnumbered. He decided to abandon his position and retreat across the Gauley River during the night.^[11] Heavy rains made the pursuit of the Rebels almost impossible, but it was still done capturing many prisoners. Rosecrans' chase continued to the Rebels' new entrenchments at the foot of B Sewell Mountain. ^[45]

After remaining there a few days, the U.S. forces fell back to Camp Ewin on New River, a very unhealthy camp, where disease rapidly thinned the ranks.^[11] The regiment continued operations in Kanawha Valley and New River Region through October into November. On October 23, Mathews was made Colonel of the 51st Ohio,^[15] turning command over to Hayes.^[13] As Hayes was promptly promoted to succeed him and, with Scammon remaining brigade commander, found himself de facto commander of the regiment, a development that met with wide approval.^[46]

There was, however, no doubt some disappointment among the senior captains already with the regiment when Ohio Governor William Dennison dispatched Maj. James M. Comly to western Virginia to take Hayes' place.^[46] Meanwhile, the Confederates had sent Lee to counter the U.S. forces in the region, however, due to the weather and terrain he failed and by mid-November, through maneuver, Rosecrans' managed to force Floyd out of the Kanawha Valley.^[47] Shortly thereafter, as snow began to blanket the mountains, the regiment moved to Fayetteville, where it went into winter quarters at Fayette Court House in November.^[48] The winter of 1861 was devoted to recruiting, drilling, and discipline. Companies F and G detached under Major Comly, and on December 31, occupied Raleigh Court House without opposition. Over 300 stands of arms, 27 prisoners, and supplies were captured.^[11]

Companies A and D were added to Colmly's detachment in the new year. On Monday, February 10, Comly marched his four companies 28 miles (45 km) from Raleigh to the mouth of Bluestone River, through a snowstorm, driving a Rebel infantry regiment and a small force of cavalry across the river. Inflicting a considerable loss on this force. The 23rd Ohio captured the Rebels' camps, tents, and forage. Rosecrans commended the force in general orders, for its bravery and efficiency.^[11]

The 23rd Ohio would finally turn in their flint-lock smoothbores for new percussion rifles in the new year, but they realized they were away from the main the war effort. Instead, Hayes and his men continued to engage in occupation duties in western Virginia as part of the 1st Brigade of Brig. Gen. Cox's Kanawha Division.^{[note 8]} They hunted whenever game was plentiful, drilled, patrolled, and entertained themselves.^[46] The men read the newspapers sent from home or purchased locally to keep up with war news, and Hayes regularly posted telegrams with war information for all the regiment to read winning the admiration and loyalty of many including McKinley.^[49] For his part, the now 19-year-old McKinley had already been recognized for his ability and worked as a clerk for the Quartermaster and occasionally filled in for the sick commissary sergeant. He performed capably and on Tuesday, April 15, was promoted to Commissary Sergeant when his predecessor was dischargeed for illness.^[50]

For the spring of 1862, Frémont had planned to gather his forces and cross over the mountains and unite with Banks' army in the Shenandoah Valley (and eventually with McDowell). Cox was originally going to his column when it approached Christiansburg. On April 17, 1862, a Thursday, the reunited regiment received orders to leave winter quarters and go into the field.^[35] The 23rd Ohio, on April 22, moved in the direction of Princeton, under command of Lt. Col. Hayes. Leading the federal advance, they reached Princeton Thursday, May 1. The Confederate forces began leaving the town on the Federals' approach and set fire to the town.^[35] From the next week, nothing but foraging and skirmishing occurred.

Despite an initial defeat of Jackson and his army at Kernstown, U.S. forces were routed by Jackson and his army when he attacked them in detail. After he defeated Frémont's subordinates, Milroy and Schenck, at McDowel, he pulled his forces back west over the mountains into West Virginia. Frémont telegraphed Cox that "his plans were suspended, and that I must look out for myself."^[51]

The enemy had made strong efforts to concentrate a sufficient force to protect the Virginia & Tennessee Railroad (V&TRR) and to reassert political control and economic control of the salt industry in the region.^[24] As part of this effort, on Thursday morning, May 8, four Rebel infantry regiments and six pieces of artillery, under Brig. Gen. Heth attacked the 23rd Ohio at Princeton. Only nine companies were present and three small companies of cavalry.^[35] Despite two of the cavalry companies retreating after first contact, the regiment held firm until overwhelmed and forced make an orderly, fighting retreat. The 23rd Ohio fell back to the northeast, being pursued by the enemy to the narrows of New River.^[35] The enemy's actions isolated the 23rd but in the night, Cox marched reinforcements to Princeton from East River and the Rebels out in turn.^[51] While the 23rd regrouped, the General Assembly of the Restored Government of Virginia passed an act on May 13, 1862, granting permission for the creation of West Virginia, which further motivated local secessionists and their compatriots in Richmond.^[52][53]

Cox gathered his two brigades at Princeton nine days later, on May 17, and offered battle in front of the town. Although the Rebels took strong positions on the hills south the town, they did not attack but remained the victors of the field having inflicted casualties on the 23rd Ohio and the cavalry on May 8.^[51] Cox realized Princeton could easily be turned by roads on the west and decided to retreat northwest to Flat Top Mountain, a stronger position.^[54] On Sunday, May 18, after destroying tents, camp, and garrison equipage, the regiment left Princeton and returned to Flat Top Mountain,^[48] after having endured excessive hardships, defeat, and food shortages.^[35]

The regiment remained at Flat Top Mountain until Sunday, July 13, when it was ordered northeast to Green Meadows, 7 miles (11 km) from Pack's Ferry, on New River. A month later, Friday, August 15, Cox was ordered to march through the mountains by way of Staunton, and join Maj. Gen. Pope who commanded the newly created Army of Virginia, at Charlottesville.^{[note 9]} Having several detachments out pursuing guerrillas and scattered bands of Confederate troops operating in his rear near the Kentucky line, he would not be able to move for a few days. While concentrating his troops at Flat Top Mountain, Cox explained to Pope, by telegraph, that marching to Charlottesville meant fifteen days of uninterrupted mountain travel through a wilderness destitute of supplies with enemy guerrillas nipping at his heels, nevermind that there was the very serious question of whether Pope would be there on schedule as Cox approached that place.^[51] Cox suggested instead that he could reach Pope in ten days or less via steamboat and railroad. Pope, with Halleck's assent, gave permission to do that on the same day.^[57]

The 23rd Ohio was ordered to march, with all possible dispatch, to meet the rest of Cox's Division at Camp Platt, the head of navigation on the Kanawha, where the regiment arrived on Monday afternoon, and embarked on river transports, having marched 104 miles (167 km) in a little more than three days.^[35] Traveling down the Kanawha and then up the Ohio to Parkersburg, the 23rd Ohio boarded the last train moving Cox's division on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad (B&O) to Washington, DC,^[48] arriving on Monday, August 25.^[58]

Other regiments had joined Pope to the south, but the 23rd Ohio remained with Cox just across the Potomac from the capital and was ordered into the fort on Upton's Hill to cover the front of Washington toward Centreville.^[57] During the Second Battle of Bull Run, the men could hear the sound of artillery from the direction of the battlefield.^[59] They soon saw army wagons, ambulances with the wounded, marching troops, and couriers passing by them to and from the battle assessing the scene. Hayes later wrote that none of these troops the observed were superior to his own regiment.^[10]

Despite significant Confederates manpower losses over the spring and summer campaigns, Lee decided to invade Maryland and Pennsylvania, and cut off the B&O from Washington threatening the capital and Baltimore, to "annoy and harass the enemy."^[60] This invasion would relieve pressure on Virginia's agriculture, lower Northern morale and adversely influence the upcoming mid-term Congressional elections of 1862 approaching in November,^[61] incite an uprising in Maryland, and gain foreign recognition by an Army of Northern Virginia (ANV) victory on Northern soil.^[62]

After Pope's defeat, Lincoln reluctantly turned back to Maj. Gen. McClellan who repaired the Army of the Potomac (AoP) after the First Battle of Bull Run and could do it again.^[63] On September 2, Lincoln named McClellan to command "the fortifications of Washington, and all the troops for the defense of the capital."^[64] McClellan, a strong organizer and a skilled trainer of troops, took command of the AoP, bolstered by units absorbed from Pope's army, included six infantry corps, about 102,000 men.^[65] The 23rd Ohio arrived in Washington, and camped in Northern Virginia, across the Potomac at Upton Hill. ^[66] The regiment was brigaded along with other troops from the Kanawha in the 1st Brigade of the Kanawha Division. Col. Scammon being the senior colonel took command of the 1st Brigade and the 39-year-old Hayes assumed command of the regiment.^{[note 10]} On Friday, September 5, the 23rd Ohio and its division were ordered to march to Leesboro (present-day Wheaton, MD ) to join the Hooker's I and Burnside's IX Corps.^{[note 11]} Leaving at daybreak Saturday, Cox and his men crossed the Potomac, marched through the city, and arrived late afternoon in Leesboro.^[66] Sometime on Sunday or Monday, the Kanawha Division was assigned to Burnside's IX Corps as its 4th Division.^[66]

McClellan's AoP left Washington starting on September 7 with his 87,000-man army in a slow pursuit.^[68] Naturally cautious, he assumed he would be facing over 120,000 Confederates, and as a result, argued with Washington that the forces defending the capital report to him.^[69] The Kanawha Division had joined an AoP with low morale after its defeats on the Peninsula and at Second Bull Run, but upon moving northwest into Maryland, the morale rose due to the "friendly, almost tumultuous welcome" that they received from the citizens of the state.^{[70][note 12]} McClellan had organized his army into three wings as he moved northwest in pursuit of Lee. Burnside, as the Right Wing, now commanded Hooker's I and IX Corps, now commanded by Reno.^[72] The Center Wing, was under Maj. Gen. Edwin Vose Sumner, was his II Corps and Mansfield's XII Corps.^[73] The Left Wing, commanded by Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin, consisted of his own VI Corps and Maj. Gen. Darius N. Couch's division of the IV Corps.^[74]

Back in friendly territory, McClellan had issued orders prohibiting pillaging, yet the AoP soon found better opportunities to supplement their rations than were available in Northern Virginia, and there were several violations of McClellan's order. Senior officers in the AoP worked to follow the order.^[75] As a result, after being assigned to IX Corps, the 23rd Ohio had a run-in with their corps commander.^[76]

On Sunday evening, September 7, the regiment went into bivouac after a long day of moving through the AoP's staging areas in the heat. Exhausted, the men had begun gathering straw for bedding from a nearby farm when Reno rode up.^[76] Seeing the men expropriating the straw, he flew into a rage and vehemently scolded them demanding to speak to their commander. When Hayes stepped forward to defend his men's conduct, Reno told him in no uncertain terms that taking property from residents of a loyal state would not be tolerated. Not backing down, Hayes snidely responded, "Well, I trust our generals will exhibit the same energy in dealing with our foes that they do in the treatment of their friends." .^{[76][note 13]} On Monday, September 8, the 23rd Ohio's division was ordered to take the advance. Enjoying the nice weather and rich farmland, the 23d Regiment was in a good mood, giving facetious answers to what troops they were on the march to Brookville.^[77] From there they led on to Goshen, then Ridgeville, where it met the B&O, moving west arriving at Frederick, shortly after noon, Friday, September 12.^[66] Hayes later wrote in his diary that, in contrast to the rugged mountains of their former location, they marched through a "well-cultivated, beautiful region," with the heat and dust moderatedf by occasional rain.^[40]

Late in the afternoon of Friday, September 12, IX Corps neared Frederick. The 23rd Ohio and its division were leading the advance and made contact with the Confederate rear-guard of cavalry under Hampton at the Monocacy River 3 miles (4.8 km) east of Frederick and drove them back into the town. Cox deployed his division in line of battle once across the river on both sides of the National Pike. The 23rd Ohio, in Scammon's brigade on the south side of the macadamized road, advanced west with its division, driving Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill's forces west out of the city with slight loss on both sides.^[35]

The 23rd Ohio and other members of the Kanawha found that Frederick was a stronghold of unionists, and as Hampton's cavalry (Hill's rearguard) departed, "while the carbine smoke and the smell of powder still lingered,"^[78] the local citizens warmly received them giving the column fruits and refreshments. Hayes wrote to his wife of the joy of the residents at their arrival after four days of occupation by the Confederates, and a local resident later wrote, "a regiment of Ohio volunteers makes its appearance and is hailed with most enthusiastic demonstrations of joy. Handkerchiefs are waved, flags are thrown from Union houses, and a new life appears infused into the people."^[79] Hayes and his men did not get to tarry in Frederick, as McClellan continued to push his people forward, and the 23rd Ohio encamped Friday night just beyond the western edge of the town.^[78]

About noon on Saturday, September 13, Cox was ordered to march 6 miles (9.7 km) northwest to Middletown, on the National Road leading to Hagerstown. {receded by a cavalry division, the Kanawha division marched over Catoctin Mountain into its valley reaching Middletown midafternoon and pushed through.^[80] Again, the men were warmly greeted by the locals.^[81] The IX Corps was now 4 miles (6.4 km) from Turner's and Fox's Gap. town Valley. Cox's men went camp on the western side of the village. ^[40]

Meanwhile, Lee learned during late Saturday afternoon, that McClellan was moving far faster than anticipated. The Confederates, with more than half of their army at Harpers Ferry, a two-day march of 15 miles (24 km), and with the remainder divided into two parts, 13 miles (21 km), from each other, were very vulnerable to defeat in detail.^[82] To remedy this, Lee told Hill to ensure the gaps in the mountains were held long enough for him to concentrate his forces at Sharpsburg.^[83]

On Sunday, arranged his three wings for the attacks on the passes at South Mountain. Burnside' Right Wing was tasked with Turner's Gap in the north. Franklin's Left Wing was assigned to Crampton's Gap in the south. McClellan kept Sumner's Center Wing in reserve.^[68]

Elements of Hill's division, primarily Garland's North Carolinians,^{[note 14]} reinforced by a regiment from Drayton's Brigade, Jones' Division, Longstreet's^[84] Right Wing, and the 5th Virginia Cavalry under Rosser were sent by Hill to defend Fox's Gap.^[85] As part of Hill's task of defending two northern gaps, as some of Lee's wagon train still had not gotten through,^{[note 15]} he was also told to watch roads toward Harpers Ferry (then under siege by Jackson) to intercept any relief effort from McClellan.^[82]

The National Road, as it went north-westward, passed through Turner's Gap, a depression in South Mountain's crest. The Old Sharpsburg Road left the turnpike a little west of Middletown to the left, and crossed the mountain at Fox's Gap, about 1 mile (1.6 km) south of Turner's. The mountain crests were 1,300 feet (400 m) above Middletown with the two gaps 200–300 feet (61–91 m) feet lower than the summits near them. These summits, scattered and somewhat irregular hills upon the high rounded surface of the mountaintop, were wooded, but along the open south-easterly slopes, quite near the top, there were small farms with meadows and cultivated fields. The Federals would have to climb up the mainly open mountainside in view of the enemy, crossing across stonewalls and fields before entering the woods at the crest to drive the Rebels off allowing the AoP to surge through and strike Lee before he could concentrate his army. Reno would direct Cox to send one of the Kanawha Division's brigades to support a cavalry reconnaissance by Brig. Gen. Pleasonton's cavalry at Turner's Gap in the morning.^[35] Cox would send Scammon's 1st Brigade with the 23rd Ohio.^[86]

The 350 men in the 23rd Ohio were ordered to arms early on Sunday, September 14,^[87] and at 6:00 am were leading Scammon's 1500-man brigade west from Middletown.^[88] The first infantry regiment in the column, Hayes and his men marched west up National Road accompanied by Cox. After 1 mile (1.6 km), Cox was surprised to meet the 28th Ohio's Col. Augustus Moor who had been captured in a skirmish in Frederick on Friday. Paroled at daylight and heading for Frederick, when Moor heard they were bound for Turner's Gap, he blurted, "My God! Be careful," then, caught himself and said, "But I am paroled!" riding on lest he violate his parole.^[89] Cox galloped back up to Scammon and Hayes at the head of his column telling them he would follow him in close support with Crook's 2nd Brigade. As he rode back down along the column, warned each regimental commander to be prepared for anything, from a skirmish to a battle.^[88] After getting Crook on the road, Cox sent word to Reno that he might meet strong resistance on the mountain and should go forward with both brigades instead of just one. Meanwhile, the 23rd Ohio had met Brig. Gen. Pleasonton, the cavalry commander, whose scouts reported he Rebels strongly posted in Turner's Gap. At 7:00 am, Pleasonton had Scammon turn left off the National Pike at its crossing of Bolivar Branch Creek, south onto the Old Sharpsburg Road which crossed the mountain at Fox's Gap.^[90] When Cox returned, he was briefed by Pleasonton at the turn off for Old Sharpsburg Road.^[89] Pleasonton planned to let his cavalry demonstrate on the main road, supporting artillery that would fire on the Rebels, while Scammon marched up the Sharpsburg road to flank the force on the summit.^[91] Telling him of his suspicions of the enemy, Cox agreed and also told him that he had Crook coming forward too, and if it became necessary to fight with the whole division, he would assume the responsibility as his senior officer for bringing on an engagement.^[89]

Scammon's brigade continued its climb, halted several times to close ranks,^[90] with the 23rd Ohio in the lead. At 7:30 am, Crook's brigade filed off the turnpike onto Old Sharpsburg Road following Scammon's path. Cox's two brigades had fully 2 miles (3.2 km) up the steep road to go before reaching their jump-off point.^[86] On the way up, a courier returned from Reno with approval of Cox' action, and the assurance that the rest of IX Corps would come forward to support. It was not long before the climbing 23rd Ohio began to see little whiffs of white smoke in the edge of the woods followed by hum of bullets high over their heads, closely followed by the reports of muskets. The men realized that they were approaching the enemy's skirmish lines, and as they drew still nearer and began to advance in line of battle over increasingly rougher groundmarked by stumps, boulders, fences, trees, ravines and knolls. As the mountain-side became steeper, the musketry became a steady roll while the bursting shells and passing solid shot shrieked and hissed.^[92]

Cox had massed his divisional artillery, on a knoll in front of the turn off at Bolivar Branch, and his 23 guns began dueling with a Rebel battery well up toward Turner's Gap at 8:00 am.^[90] Hill instructed Garland to sweep through the woods, reach the Old Sharpsburg Road, and hold it all costs, as the safety of Lee's large train depended upon its being held.^[93] The 3,000 men of the Kanawha Division would advance on the 1,000 odd men of Garland's five regiment brigade. Garland's planned line would run from Old Sharpsburg Road up the hill, along a ridge road that ran along the crest of the mountain, up to the edge of the woods.^[91][94][95] Rosser's cavalry would be further up the hill on his right.^[94]

At about .5 miles (800 m) from the summit on the road to Fox's Gap, the Pelham's horse artillery, supported by Rosser's 5th Virginia Cavalry, had opened upon Scammon from the edge of the timber above the open fields, and Scammon had judiciously turned off upon an unfrequented road leading up the mountain just south of the main road,^[68] leading still farther to the left and nearly parallel to the ridge above. Here, Cox overtook him, his brigade being formed in line, under cover of the timber, facing open pasture fields, having a stone-wall along the upper side, with the forest again beyond this.^[86] Cox, instead of pushing directly into the gap, had Scammon advance further along a small road, screened by woods, to get around the Rebels' southern flank. The 23rd Ohio was sent to advance for a flank attack on the Rebel left by an unfrequented road leading up the mountain just south of the main road, followed the 12th and 30th Ohio. ^[68] Although the 23rd Ohio's column moving up the road to the left was screened by trees, Hayes deployed Capt James P. McGrath's Company A^[96] as skirmishers to his right front in the woods, but receiving word that the Rebels were nearby, he also pushed Capt. Israel Canby's Company F out as left flank and Capt. Selleck B. Warren's Company I as right flank guards.^[46]

Meanwhile, Garland's brigade reached the mountain crest from the other side and moved south along the ridge road that intersected Old Sharpsburg Road at the crest at the Wise family's farm in Fox's Gap.^[97] Garland directed McRae's 5th North Carolina, to turn left short of the intersection with the mountain road and deploy in line of battle along the ridge road up the hill behind a fence overlooking a cornfield about 150 yards east of the ridge road to the right of Old Sharpsburg Road.^[94][46] The 12th North Carolina, as its support, and the 23rd North Carolina were posted along the ridge road behind a low stone-wall between Old Sharpsburg Road and the 5th. The 20th and 13th North Carolina were not in contact with the other three but further down the ridge road with 150 yards between them.^[95] Garland had also split Captain Bondurant's Jeff Davis (Alabama) Artillery of two 3-inch Ordnance Rifles and two 12-pounder Howitzers, placing one section on the ridge road between the 12th and 23rd North Carolina and the other across the Old Sharpsburg Road, also on the ridge road, between the 13th North Carolina and the main road.^[94][98]

As his men deployed, Garland sent scouts forward who soon spotted the 23rd Ohio's column moving behind the trees on his right front, outheast of the cornfield, and reported back.^[97] Realizing the 23rd Ohio was moving to higher ground from where they could turn his flank, Garland had McRae push forward 50 skirmishers of the 5th North Carolina who around 9:00 am made contact the 23rd Ohio's Company A who formed a line facing the cornfield.^[99] At the sound of contact, Garland ordered McRae to go over the fence into the cornfield and advance on the Federals.^[97] Meanwhile, Scammon had halted the 12th and 30th Ohio and was forming them into battle line facing the crest.^[86] Cox had returned, and Crook's brigade was behind him and soon began deploying for battle behind Scammon.^[100][94]

Through the trees and still atop his horse, Hayes was able to see the 5th North Carolina coming over the febce and toward him in the cornfield. He halted his column in the woods and formed it into line of battle facing the enemy. Once in position, he then ordered his men forward over the rough ground between them and the advancing Rebels in the cornfield^[46] The 23rd Ohio advanced in line, initially alone, with its skirmishers out front.^[101] Hayes' advance startled the inexperienced troops on the right of the 5th North Carolina's advancing line who quickly broke and forced McRae and the rest of the regiment to fall back to their original position behind the fence. Scammon saw the 23rd Ohio suddenly advancing out of the woods on his left and soon had White's 12th Ohio and Ewing's 30th Ohio hustling forward in support.^[94]

Posted behind the fence and stone walls, the 5th North Carolina soon poured a destructive fire of musketry, grape, and canister into the regiment at close range.^[102] They were soon joined by the 23rd North Carolina on their left, which had advanced about forty yards from the ridge road in front of the Wise farm to counter White's, who had by then come up.^[46] The volume of fire soon stopped Hayes' advance in the cornfield 100 yards (91 m) from the Confederates. Hayes, who had dismounted for the passage through the corn, ordered a charge.^[46]

Very quickly, Hayes and several command elements were badly wounded (Hayes's arm broken), and over 100 dead and wounded lay on the mountain slope including his Serggeant Major.^[103] Struck in the left arm just above his elbow, Hayes refused to leave the field but tried to carry on. When the enemy, probably Rosser's dismounted cavalrymen,^[94] suddenly opened fire from the left, Hayes ordered Capt. James L. Drake's Company H, his left flank company, to refuse the line to counter the new threat, however to his dismay, his whole regiment began falling back to the woods leaving him lying in no-man's land.^[46] When the men realized they had left him, a party came back that attracted heavy fire such that Hayes told them to fall back.^[104] A second attempt 20 minutes later was successful and brought him back behind the regiment now in the woods. After arguing with his staff, Hayes relented and departed to have his wound dressed, officially passing command to Maj. Comly.^[105]

Colmly quickly refused the regiment's left to defend against the Rebels there. While not breaking the Rebel line, Scammon's brigade had battered it.^[46] Elements of Crook's brigade had extended Scammon's left and right flanks. Cox had Crook send Col. Ogden Street's 11th Ohio up the hill on Colmly's left, but they were repulsed. Lt. Col. Gottfried Becker's 28th Ohio entered the line to the right of the 30th Ohio. Scammon had the 11th, 12th, and 23rd make a coordinated charge up the hill. Garland's brigade managed one volley before the three regiments were on them and over the fence and walls,^[106] dislodging the enemy and driving them into the woods beyond leaving a large number of their men killed by bayonet.^[107] The 11th Ohio drove Rosser's cavalry and a battery from the left. The 23rd Ohio and the 12th sent the 5th, 12th, 23rd and 20th North Carolina reeling back.

Elements of Crook's brigade had extended Scammon's right flank as well; Ewing's 30th Ohio now had Lt. Col. Gottfried Becker's 28th Ohio and Crook's own 36th Ohio on their right.^[106] The left cleared and center completely broken, these two regiments pushed the Confederate left. Garland was between them and the Wise farm on the crest with the 13th North Carolina's commander, Lt. Col. Ruffin.^[108] Ruffin was soon wounded in the hip and Garland was mortally wounded soon after. Garland soon died and the Ruffin quickly found out the rest of the brigade was gone and the Cox's division was just up the ridge road.^[101] Ruffin began a fighting retreat to a secondary position along the Old Sharpsburg Road and gathered the remnants of the brigade.^[109] The Kanawha Division still came on and in a bitter struggle once again drove the Rebels beyond Sharpsburg Road and up the slope of the crest toward the Mountain House at Turner's Gap.^[110][94] The 5th North Carolina, cut off, retreated southwest down the mountain toward Rohrersville.^[101] The Rebels' left flank conducted a fighting retreat until the arrival of Anderson's brigade.

Although Garland's line had been broken, the rallying and fighting had been stubborn for more than an honr. Cox's men were now positioned diagonally across the mountaintop with the right exposed to a severe artillery fire.^[106] The men of the 23rd Ohio and their comrades learned from their prisoners that they were up against Hill's five-brigade division, and that Longstreet was said to be in near support. The 23rd Ohio's and the division's losses had not been trifling, and Cox deemed it wise to contract his lines, so that he could hold the crest until the rest of IX Corps arrived.^[106] To protect his right, he pulled the 30th and 36th Ohio back to the crest into the woods on the south side of the gap, where he could still command the Sharpsburg road, and making the 30th Ohio his right flank, with the 28th and 36th Ohio in second line. His right in the woods now looked north into Wise's fields.^[106] His two brigades now used the stonewall along the crest road to anchor their positions.^[94]

By noon, the Rebels had drawn out of range of the 23rd Ohio and its brethren and the battle was reduced an artillery duel. At 2:00 pm, IX Corps elements began arriving with Willcox's division reporting to Cox. Reno soon brought the remainder of the corps up and renewed the battle for Fox's Gap during the afternoon. During the remainder of the day the regiment fought with its division.^[35] The Kanawha had pushed the Rebels back, the 23rd Ohio participating in three bayonet charges that day, and inflicted heavy losses but the men were exhausted.^[111] This pause allowed Confederate reinforcements under Hood to deploy in the gap around the Daniel Wise farm. Now the corps commander, Cox could not drive the defenders off the mountain.^[112] Hood also could not drive IX Corps from the crest road. Shortly after personally commending Scammon on his brigade's performance, Reno was mortally wounded and Cox moved up to command the corps. Scammon took over the Kanawha Division, and Ewing took command of the brigade. The 23rd Ohio and the Kanawha held their positions and repulsed Confederate attacks trying to close Fox's Gap. By nightfall, the Confederates were still on the mountain but had lost control of the gaps and therefore withdrew in the night giving the AoP claim to victory.

Armstrong, in Major McKinley, notes that while the future president held one of the more desirable, safer assignments in the regiment, he would find himself in dangerous situations, such as delivering rations in West Virginia to detachments or in foraging parties.^[113]} In heavy contact, such as at Fox's Gap, he had to deliver rations to the regiment on the battle line. The young man censored himself in his letters home, and later in a speech commemorating Hayes in 1893, but he was witness to the losses from the costly victory.^[114] The 23rd Ohio lost nearly 200 men killed, mortally wounded, or wounded with seven men missing at the post-battle muster while the men's symbolic identity, the regimental colors were quite tattered from Rebel artillery and musketry.^[115]

With Lee's withdrawal to Sharpsburg, if McClellan had moved quickly, he might have caught Lee's army before it could concentrate.^{[116][note 16]} The 23rd Ohio, and the rest of the army, were buoyed by the victory where they ended "the tide of Rebel successes,"^[117] Lee considered ending his invasion. However, McClellan's limited activity on Monday, September 15, doomed the U.S. garrison at Harpers Ferry,^[118] and gave Lee time to unite the rest of his army at Sharpsburg before the upcoming battle on Tuesday.^[119]

On Monday, the 23rd Ohio woke up to a new chain of command as a result Sunday's casualties. The Kanawha's commander was the new commander of IX Corps.^{[note 17]} This had a ripple effect down the chain with Col. Scammon moving up to command the Kanawha Division. His replacement to command the 1st Brigade was Col. Ewing from the 30th Ohio. As a result of Hayes' wounds, Maj. Comly remained in command of the regiment.^[67]

On Monday, Lee deployed his troops behind Antietam Creek along a low ridge in an effective defensive, yet not impregnable, position with excellent cover for infantrymen, with rail and stone fences, outcroppings of limestone, little hollows and swales. Antietam Creek between them and the AoP was only a minor barrier, 60–100 feet (18–30 m) wide, fordable in places, and crossed by three stone bridges each 1 mile (1.6 km) apart. The AVN's rear was blocked by the Potomac and only a single crossing point, Boteler's Ford at Shepherdstown, was available if it needed to retreat.^{[note 18]} At Sharpsburg on Monday, Lee had a force of only 18,000 men, only a third the size of the AoP.^[123]

With the rest of IX Corps, the 23rd spent Monday morning recuperating from the battle, and during the afternoon, marched west off the mountain towards Sharpsburg and eventually went into bivouac east of Antietam Creek with the rest of the AoP as the Rebels continued to concentrate across the creek from them in the town. Historians have written that an immediate AoP attack on Tuesday morning, September 16, would have had an overwhelming advantage in numbers, but due to his trademark caution and mistaken belief that he faced as many as 100,000 men, McClellan delayed his attack for a day.^[124] Ergo, Lee had more time to prepare defensive positions and to gather Longstreet's corps from Hagerstown and Jackson's corps, minus A.P. Hill's division, from Harpers Ferry. Jackson took up the left (northern) flank and Longstreet the right (southern) flank on the 4 miles (6.4 km) Rebel line.^[125]

Tuesday evening, McClellan sent Hooker's I Corps across Antietam to probe the enemy positions. Meade's division cautiously attacked Hood's troops near the East Woods. After darkness fell, artillery fire continued as McClellan arranged the AoP for the next day. At 9:00 p.m., it started raining.^[126] His plan was to overwhelm the enemy's left flank due to the configuration of bridges over the Antietam. The lower bridge, Burnside Bridge, was dominated by the occupied bluffs overlooking it, the middle bridge on the Boonsboro road in Rebel artillery field of fire from the heights near Sharpsburg, but the upper bridge was 2 miles (3.2 km) east of the Confederate guns safe to cross. McClellan planned to launch more than half the AoP in assault, starting with two corps, supported by a third, and if necessary a fourth. He planned a simultaneous diversionary attack on the Confederate right with a fifth corps, and prepared an attack on Lee's center with his reserves if either attack succeeded.^[127] The skirmish in the East Woods gave away McClellan's plan, and Lee shifted men to the left flank and sent urgent messages to his two commanders who had not yet arrived on the battlefield: Lafayette McLaws with two divisions and A.P. Hill with one division.^[128]

McClellan's planning and execution were poor as he issued each of his subordinate commanders only the orders for his own corps and did not let them know his entire battle plan. The battlefield terrain made is subordinates' ability to monitor events outside of their sectors difficult. Additionally, McClellan's headquarters were more than a mile in the rear degrading his control of separate corps. This lack of coordination and concentration almost completely nullified the AoP's numerical advantage the Union enjoyed and let Lee shift his troops to meet each offensive.^[124]

The 23rd Ohio and the Kanawha moved forward with the rest of Burnside's wing and by the time of Meade's probe late Tuesday afternoon, the Kanawha was positioned in the font of the AoP's left facing the Longstreet's Corps across Antietam Creek.^[129] On Wednesday morning, on September 17, the fighting began at dawn (about 5:30 a.m.) with Hooker's I Corps attack down the Hagerstown Turnpike^[130] Fighting was heavy with a series of counterattacks on the Rebel left through the morning.^[131]

As the combat continued through the morning on the AoP's right and center, the Kanawha Division was split and Ewing's brigade with the 23rd Ohio was made the 3rd brigade of Rodman's 3rd Division, IX Corps.^{[115][note 19]}

Facing them was a Rebel right thinned by Lee's movement of units to his left flank. The two divisions at dawn, David R. Jones' and John G. Walker's, had been reduced to Jones' less George T. Anderson's Georgia brigade by 10 a.m. Four thin brigades guarded the ridges near the town primarily on Cemetery Hill. The remaining 400 men of the 2nd and 20th Georgia Infantry and two artillery batteries, under Toombs defended Rohrbach's Bridge, the stone three-span, 125 feet (38 m) structure^[134] that would become known to history as "Burnside's Bridge" because of the notoriety of the coming battle'^[135] The main road leading to it was exposed to enemy fire, but a farm lane allowed a more protected approach to around 250 yards (230 m) from the bridge.^[136] The Rebel position on a steep nearly 100 feet (30 m)rise dominated it with trees and an old quarry and stonewall provided cover for defenders.^[137] The Confederates also strengthened their position with breastworks made from logs and fence rails.^[135]

Despite the fact that the creek could have been forded "at a variety of places out of enemy range,"^[138] Burnside concentrated his plan instead on storming the bridge while simultaneously crossing a ford .5 miles (0.80 km) downstream. While Crook prepared to lead Sturgis's attack on the bridge, the 23rd Ohio's brigade in Rodman's division advanced south toward a ford of the Antietam downstream from Burnside Bridge. Once across, the brigade would be in position to support the 3rd Division when it crossed the Antietam over the bridge from the high ground toward the Harpers Ferry Road south of the town.^[115]

When Rodman's men reached the first ford, they found the banks too high to negotiate and struggled through thick brush trying to locate Snavely's Ford, a ford recommended by some local farmers,^[139] 2 miles (3.2 km) downstream, intending to flank the Confederates. ,"^[140]

Crook's assault was led by skirmishers from the 11th Connecticut, who after receiving punishing fire for 15 minutes, withdrew losing one-third of their strength.^[141] Crook's main effort failed when his unfamiliarity with the terrain brought his brigade into full view of the dug-n Rebels, .25 miles (0.40 km) upstream from the bridge, where they exchanged volleys with Confederate skirmishers for the next few hours.^[142]

While the 23rd Ohio and its division were struggling toward Snavely's Ford, Burnside and Cox directed a second assault by Sturgis's 1st Brigade under Nagle which also suffered galling Confederate musketry and artillery until its attack fell apart.^[143] By noon, McClellan, losing patience, had sent multiple couriers to Burnside urging him forward. Burnside indignantly told the last, "McClellan appears to think I am not trying my best to carry this bridge; you are the third or fourth one who has been to me this morning with similar orders."^[144]

Sturgis' 2nd Brigade, under Edward Ferrero, made a third attempt on the bridge at 12:30 p.m. closing to within 25 yards (23 m) of the Confederates. At that time, the 23rd Ohio and its division had reached Snavely's Ford and begun crossing. A half hour later, at 1:00 p.m., Toombs' ammunition was running low and word reached him that the Rodman was across the creek on his right flank so he withdrew to the heights having traded fewer than 160 casualties for 500 AoP casualties and they stalled Burnside for more than three hours.^{[145][note 20]}